The impact of high-stakes school admission exams on study achievements: quasi-experimental evidence from Slovakia

Vědecký článek Miroslavy Federičové a Daniela Münicha z CERGE-EI otištěný v Journal of Population Economics se zabývá dopady konkurečních přijímacích zkoušek na víceletá gymnázia na vzdělávací výsledky žáků (v důsledku přípravy na zkoušky). Unikátní empirický výzkum umožnila reforma přijímacích zkoušek na Slovensku, díky které bylo možno sledovat reakci žáků na změnu. Abstract: We explore whether and to what extent the presence of high-stakes admission exams to selective schools affects student achievement, presumably through more intensive study effort. Our identification strategy exploits a quasi-experimental feature of a reform in Slovakia that shifted the school grade during which high-stakes exams are taken by 1 year. 

Alphabetical order effects in school admissions. By Daniel Münich and Štěpán Jurajda in Research Papers in Education

If school admission committees use alphabetically sorted lists of applicants in their evaluations, one’s position in the alphabet according to last name initial may be important in determining access to selective schools. Jurajda and Münich (2010) ‘Admission to Selective Schools, Alphabetically. Economics of Education Review, 29 (6): 1100–1109’ provide evidence consistent with this hypothesis based on graduation exams taken in grade 13 in the Czech Republic: ‘Z’ students in selective schools had higher exam scores than ‘A’ students. In this paper, we use the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study & Progress in International Reading Literacy Study test scores of 4th graders and the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test scores of 8th and 9th graders in the Czech Republic to provide evidence on how the alphabetical sorting outcome uncovered in Jurajda and Münich (2010) ‘Admission to Selective Schools, Alphabetically. Economics of Education Review, 29 (6): 1100–1109’ arises during early tracking into selective schools. Using the PISA data, we also provide corresponding evidence for Denmark, where sorting into selective schools happens in higher grades.